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Privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation: Policy Assessment
Fumitoshi Mizutani and Shuji Uranishi
1. Introduction
Unlike the expressway systems of the U.S. and Europe, where road use is largely free of
charge, the Japanese expressway system consists mostly of toll roads.    The toll expressway system
was instituted  after  World War  II to  expedite  construction  of a nation-wide  expressway  network.
Originally it was intended that the system ultimately become free of charge, as soon as the national
expressway network was completed and construction debts repaid.    Although expressway tolls are
collected based on each individual route, tolls are included within the same budget and pooled for
the construction of other routes, in what is called a pool system.    However, problems have occurred
in such a system.    Expressway users have been required to continue paying expressway tolls along
trunk  expressways  near  big  cities  where  construction  costs  have  long  been  completely  repaid.
Furthermore, in rural areas where the demand for expressway use  is low, the system continues to
construct expressways simply  because  rural residents expect them to be constructed.    Users  have
also been dissatisfied with the high price of expressway use, attributing the cost to what they have
perceived as the monopolistic nature of the public corporation system, which, like the former Japan
National Railway, had no competition.
In this environment, Prime Minister Koizumi appointed a special committee to define the
role  of  the  Japan  Highway  Public  Corporation  and  to  determine  whether  or  not  it  should  be
privatized,  and  the issue  of highway  privatization  became  controversial  in  Japan.  Although there
were effective arguments pro and con, it was decided that the corporation be privatized.    In October
2005, the Japan Highway Public  Corporation  was privatized  and separated  into three expressway
companies, and the following companies were also privatized: the Metropolitan Expressway Public
Corporation,  the  Hanshin  Expressway  Public  Corporation,  and  the  Honshu-Shikoku  Bridge
authority.  
The  main  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  assess  the  privatization  policy  taken  by  the
government.    We  will  focus  especially  on  policy  issues  such  as  (1)  ownership,  (2)  regional
subdivision, (3) vertical separation, (4) cost structure, (5) investment behavior, (6) the pricing system,
(7)  the  management  and  incentive  system  of  internal  organization,  (8)  public  regulations,  and
political intervention.    We will evaluate these aspects comparing the before-privatization and after-
privatization periods of the Japan Expressway Public Corporation.    As the performance results of
the  new  organization  are  not  available  yet  because  privatization  is  quite  recent,  our  conceptual
outcomes will be based on theory, and on the lessons learned from the privatization  of the Japan
National Railway, information  about which the authors obtained from a series of studies, such as3
Mizutani and Nakamura (1997, 2004) and Mizutani (1999).
2.    International Comparison of Highway Systems
In this section, in order to delineate the characteristics of the Japanese highway system, we
compare  highway  systems  in  four  major  industrial  countries:  the  USA,  Germany,  the  UK,  and
France.    Table  1 shows  the basic  features  of  road  transportation.    Japan’s  land  area  is slightly
larger  than  Germany’s  but  only  70%  of  France’s.    Moreover,  70%  of Japan’s  total  land  area  is
mountainous,  so that intercity  highways  must incorporate  a large number  of tunnels  and elevated
bridges.  
The total  population  of Japan  is about 128 million,  about  55%  larger  than  Germany’s.
The majority of the population is concentrated in the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya metropolitan areas,
but  the  entire  Pacific  corridor  of  Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka-Hiroshima-Fukuoka  is  highly  congested,
with the main trunk lines thus being located along this corridor.
While the dominant mode of transportation in Japan is the automobile, rail transportation
is still a quite  vital  transportation  mode,  especially  in the large  metropolitan  areas  of Tokyo  and
Osaka and on the intercity trunk line between Tokyo and Osaka, where railways still retain a large
share of the transportation market.    The heavy use of rail transport in these areas affects the ratio of
traffic  volume  (vehicle-km)  to  registered  cars  in  Japan,  making  the  ratio  lower  than  in  other
countries.














USA 9,629 285,318 11,004,100 230,428 4,462,811
Germany   357   82,541   2,403,160   47,696   639,100
UK   243   59,511   1,797,677   29,291   484,722
France   552   59,762   1,759,029   35,642   546,500
Japan   378 127,619   4,302,557   74,218   790,829
(Source): Road Economic  Research Institute  and Research Circle of Road Transport  Economics
(2006), p.247.
Table  2  shows  an  international  comparison  of  highway  length  among  five  countries.
Although Germany’s famous “Autobahn” highway system, for example, was built before World War
II, the Japanese highway system dates back only 50 years, to 1956.    From the beginning, highways
in Japan were not freeways, but toll roads.    Even with the sharp increase in highway construction
over the past fifty years, the number and capacity of highways has been deemed insufficient.    In
some measures such as highway length per population, per GDP, per registered car and per annual
vehicle-km, the figures for Japan are lower than those of other countries.    Although there are many4
outspoken  critics  of  further  highway  construction,  statistics  show  that  in  comparison  with  other
countries, Japan does not have enough highways..




















USA 9.33 314.94 8.17 389.97 20.14
Germany 33.72 148.83 5.00 252.37 18.83
UK 14.30   58.40 1.93 118.67   7.17
France 18.82 173.86 5.90 291.51 19.01
Japan 19.30   57.17 1.70   98.30 9.23
(Source): Road Economic  Research Institute  and Research Circle of Road Transport  Economics
(2006), p.248.
3.  Japanese Highway System
3.1 Brief History of Japan Highway Public Corporation
According  to  the Editorial  Board  of “A  30-Year  History  of  the  Japan  Highway  Public
Corporation”  (1986),  the Japan Highway Public  Corporation  was  established  in April, 1956, as a
special public  corporation by the national government.    During  that time, as Japan was emerging
into sharp economic growth from the reconstruction period after World War II, the demand for car
usage  was  increasing  sharply  by  the  year.    However,  the  road  network  in  Japan  was  not  well
developed: the main intercity road network among large cities was not well built and the pavement
ratio of national roads did not reach even 20%
1.
To address the need perceived by the government for a national road network, in 1952 the
government revised the Road Law (Doroho), which was the main regulation for road policy, and set
up a system for constructing the highway network.    Furthermore, the national government enacted
new  laws  such  as  the  Road  Improvement  Special  Law  (Doro  Seibi  Tokubetsu  Sochiho)  and  the
Special Road Improvement Accounting Law (Tokutei Doro Seibi Jigyo Tokubetsu Kaikeho) in order
to  borrow  money  from  postal  savings  because  the  national  government’s  general  account  was
insufficient to finance construction of a road network.    The enactment of these laws saw a shift in
road  policy  from  the traditional  view  that  roads  should  be free,  to  the idea  that  tolls  should  be
imposed  to  support  the  maintenance  and  expansion  of  the  road  network  (Imahashi  and  Takeda,
1992).  
                                                        
1 Based upon each year’s statistics issued by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the
pavement ratio of national roads was 17.2% at the end of FY1955 and 32.6% in FY1960.5
Between 1952 and 1956, highways as portions of a toll road system were constructed in 8
places by the national  government  and  in 27 places  by local  governments.  Such  activity  spurred
further construction, but progress was not without problems, such as difficulties among governments
in coordinating administration  as well as in financing the highways.    There arose a demand for a
central  organization  which  would systematically  construct  a  highway  network.    As  a result,  the
Japan Highway Public Corporation Law (Nihon Doro Kodanho) was approved in March 1956, and
the Japan Highway Public Corporation was established in April of the same year.
3.2 Public Corporation
The  Japan  Highway  Public  Corporation,  a  special  corporation  with  100%  national
government investment, was established in 1956.    According to the Editorial Board of “A 30-Year
History of the Japan Highway Public Corporation” (1986), before the corporation was established,
there was argument about what kind of management form the national government should take.    A
condition  of  financial  self-support  was  decided,  making  it  necessary  for  the  organization  to  be
managerially independent from the government, as there were plans for the organization to construct
highways using not only public money but also a private fund.
There were three alternatives for management form: (i) a public corporation (Kosha), (ii) a
special company  (Tokushu  Kaisya),  (iii)  a non-commercialized  public  corporation  (Kodan).    The
public  corporation  is  a  commercial  based  public  corporation  invested  in  by  the  government.
Although the public corporation (Kosha) type has a public purpose, it also recognizes the importance
of  providing  services  with  a  commercial  basis  (Sasaki,  1994).    Typical  examples  of  this
management form were the former Japan National Railways (now the JR companies) and the Nippon
Telephone  and  Telegram  (now  NTT).    A  special  company  (Tokushu  Kaisya)  is  a  joint  stock
company type invested in by the government.    This type is more commercial oriented but there is a
public  purpose.      An  example  of  this  type  is  Electric  Power  Development  Company.    Finally,
while  the  non-commercialized  public  corporation  (Kodan)  has  a  more  public  purpose,  the
organization is separated from the governmental body in order to acquire managerial independence
or financial self-support.    Japan Housing and Urban Development Corporation is an example of this
type.  
Among  these  alternatives,  the  special  company  type  was  excluded  because  the
management form is different from a “governmental organization” and the road law would have to
regulate the “governmental organization”.    Finally, the plan and construction of a highway network
would  be  decided  by  the  Diet  and  more  governmental  intervention  was  deemed  necessary.
Therefore, the non-commercialized public corporation type was chosen.6
3.3 Process of Highway Construction
The process of the highway plan to construction is summarized in Figure 1.  
  (Note): This figure was made by the authors based on several sources from the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport.
Figure 1ɹProcess of Highway Construction
There are two important considerations  regarding decisions whether highways should be
constructed.    First, it is not the highway related public corporation which has control over which
highways are constructed.    The final  decision rests with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure  and
Transport, and it is this Ministry which orders the Public Corporation to construct the highway in
question.    Therefore, the problem of overinvestment in highways does not originate with the Japan
Public Corporation and should be separated from discussion of its problems.
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Second, as we can see in the flow chart, in the process of highway construction, political
intervention exists in the stages of making master and construction plans to the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure  and  Transport.    Politicians  care  about  the  construction  of  highways  because  they
believe  that  highways  are  necessary  conditions  for  the  economic  development  of  rural  areas.
Another reason for politicians’ promotion of highway construction in rural areas is that construction
is an important industry there.    While the decision to construct a highway is evaluated on the basis
of a cost-benefit  analysis,  the final  decision  of whether  to construct  is made  in the Diet, so that
political intervention is not inevitable.  
3.4 Pricing System
As we mentioned before, the Japanese highway system is basically a toll road system, with
users required to pay.    There are two important points in the pricing system of highways.    One is
the full repayment principle and the other is the polling system of toll revenues.
Full Repayment Principle
The full repayment principle is the basic concept for designing the price level of highways.
The basic concept  is that the total costs  of the construction  of highways,  including  costs of land
acquisition and interest payments, and highway  service costs such as maintenance costs including
administration costs, must be repaid by toll revenues collected over certain time ranges.    After the
repayment of all construction costs, the highways are converted to toll-free roads.
The  full  repayment  principle  is  based  on  the  idea  that  a  highway  is  part  of  a  social
infrastructure  which  the  government  should  provide  without  collecting  user  charges,  as  the
government  does  not  charge  for  the  use  of  other  infrastructure.    However,  because  of  budget
constraints  in  the  general  account,  the  full  repayment  principle  was  selected  as  an  alternative
approach, in which the highway network is constructed by moneys borrowed and debts are repaid
with the tolls of highway users.
Pooling System of Toll Revenues
The second important point is the pooling system of toll revenues.    In the Japan Highway
Public Corporation, toll revenues from each highway route are pooled in the same place and then
used for repayment of all highways in the network.    The toll level, then, is not designated by each
route  but  it  is  determined  by  the  situation  of  the  whole  network.    Therefore,  the  toll  level  is
designated by equalizing the total toll revenues from all routes for a set of time period to the total
costs of highways.    For an ordinary toll road, the toll level is designated to match each route’s toll
revenue to each route’s costs.    Certainly, in the highway network, cross-subsidy among routes and
generation is taking place.8
Highway Toll Charge
The highway  toll is decided with regard to the full repayment principle  and the pooling
system of toll revenue.    According to Miyagawa (2006), the highway toll is calculated as follows:
Pij = (p TL + pt ) (1 + t), (3.1)
Where  Pij: Highway toll between lamp i and lamp j
p: Unit price per km
TL: Travel length (km)
pt: Terminal charge
tc: Consumption tax (5%)
The unit price of highway toll, p, is set to attain total costs of all highway network equal to
total toll revenues  of  all highway  networks  for 45 to 50 years.      In  this case, highway  network
means the total 9,064km which the national government decided to construct in 1987.    Of course,
tolls  differ  according  to  vehicle  type,  but  the  calculation  method  is  the  same.    According  to
Miyagawa (2006), the current unit price of a highway toll (p) is 24.6 yen and the terminal charge (pt)
is 150 yen..
The toll level of the Japanese highway system is much higher than in other countries.    For
example, in Japan the unit toll level is 24.6 yen per km, but it is 6.4 yen in France, 5.1 yen in Italy
and 3.7 yen in Korea (Miyagawa, 2006).    The following reasons might explain higher construction
costs leading to higher tolls.    Japan is mountainous, so that more expensive infrastructure such as
tunnels  and  bridges  are  required  to  construct  highways.    The  prevalence  and  frequency  of
earthquakes  also  require  more  expensive  anti-earthquake  infrastructure.    Although  these  natural
conditions  might  partly  explain  the  higher  toll  level  in  Japan,  some  have  claimed  that  the  full
repayment principle and the pooling system are causing unnecessarily expensive tolls.
4. Financial Structure of Japan Highway Public Corporation
4.1 Costs and Revenues of Japan Highway Public Corporation
In this section, we will overview  the figures  for the Japan Highway Public Corporation
based on the available data set.    First, Table 3 shows trends in road length and number of vehicles
using the roads of the Japan Highway Public Corporation.    The Japan Highway Public Corporation
provides not only highway roads but general toll roads, although the total length of general toll roads
is not large.    The national government‘s plan for the highway network in 1987 was 9,064km, and
81% of the highway network was completed by the end of 2003.9
Table 3    Trend of Road Length and Number of Vehicles








1956 -   95 - 17 - 4,885
1960 - 369 - 45 - 26,565
1965   190 623   1 65   13,703 121,531
1970   649 799   5 62   117,473 248,301
1975 1,888 737 18 53   278,015 312,239
1980 2,860 805 19 55   452,216 414,722
1985 3,721 621 25 51   628,569 493,453
1990 4,869 660 36 48 1,008,648 652,872
1995 5,930 634 43 50 1,383,894 676,245
2000 6,851 824 48 65 1,466,234 781,275
2003 7,343 921 55 66 n.a. n.a.
‘00/’70 10.6 1.0 9.6 1.0 12.5 3.1
(Note): This table was made by the authors based on Japan Highway Public Corporation’s FY2003
Annual Statistics and FY2003 Business Reports.
Next, we would like to summarize  the financial  structure  of the Japan Highway  Public
Corporation.    Table  4 shows the revenue  structure  and Table 4.3 shows the cost structure  of the
Japan Highway Public Corporation.    Statistics for both tables are obtained from the profit and loss
statements of the corporation.    On an annual basis, these total revenues are almost equal to the total
costs.
Table 4    Revenue Structures





Sub Total Subsidy Others Revenues /Total
Revenues
1956   261 0   261 - 113 374 69.8%
1960 2,253 74 2,327 - 268 2,595 89.7%
1965 14,832 420 15,252 - 340 15,592 97.8%
1970 78,989 1,139 80,128 - 1,247 81,375 98.5%
1975 248,169 2,041 250,210 12,811 1,831 264,852 94.5%
1980 504,915 3,788 508,703 38,231 4,316 551,250 92.3%
1985 839,115 4,234 843,349 88,773 7,876 939,998 89.7%
1990 1,421,425 79,375 1,500,800 10,891 5,738 1,517,429 98.9%
1995 1,913,348 7,948 1,921,296 132,585 7,053 2,060,934 93.2%
2000 2,096,233 12,999 2,109,232 87,716 8,889 2,205,837 95.6%
2003 2,069,939 15,258 2,085,197 - 23,718 2,108,915 98.9%
‘00/’70 26.5 11.4 26.3 6.8* 7.1 27.1 0.97
(Note):
(1)  This table was made by the authors based on the Japan Highway Public Corporation’s Annual Profit
and Loss Statement.
(2)  Unit: million yen
(3)  “Other User Charges” include (i) user charge for exclusive use of road, (ii) revenues from parking
lots, (iii) revenues from SA, (iv) revenues from truck terminals, and so on.
(4)  “Others” include (i) revenues by contracted-in, (ii) revenues from non-road service revenues, etc.10
As for the revenue structure, there are three main sources of revenue: (i)service revenue
from highway and facility users, (ii) government subsidies, (iii) others.    Service revenues consist of
toll revenues and other user charges, such as revenue from parking lots and tenant revenues of the JH
etc.    And “others” include (ii) revenues by contracted-in, and (ii) revenues from non-road service
revenues, etc.    Service revenues account for 98.9% of total revenues.
On the other hand, the cost structure of the current financial statement is not as simple as
for the revenue structure.    We summarize the cost structure in Table 5.    As this table shows, the
accounting system changed in 1986.    First, we will explain each category of costs.    The total costs
are  classified  into  (i)  Road  Service  Costs,  (ii)  Depreciation,  (iii)  Non-road  Service  Costs,  (iv)
Reserves, and (v) Repayment Fund.    First, “Road Service Costs” consist of general administration
costs and maintenance costs of highways.    Therefore, these costs are considered as the maintenance
activity  costs  for  already  constructed  highway  networks.    Second,  “Non-road  Service  Costs”
comprise the costs of interest payment  on bonds and loans, etc.    As this table shows, accounting
rules were changed in 1986, after which the depreciation of highway facilities was not accounted for,
replaced by the item “Repayment Fund,” which refers to pooled money for repayment of debts.
As for the cost structure, the most important thing is that road service costs are only 17 to
18% of the total costs and have remained fairly  steady since the 1980s.    Most  of JH’s costs are
capital costs.    Although  it is said that the JH has a huge amount  of debts, its financial  structure
might actually be healthy if it were to stop new consturction.    In the next section, we explore the
relationship between debts and construction expenditures.













1956 172 28 288 0 - 488 35.2%
1960 746 529 1,744 146 - 3,165 23.6%
1965 3,326 3,421 12,347 1,357 - 20,451 16.3%
1970 11,110 10,801 49,726 5,661 - 77,298 14.2%
1975 45,560 75,827 142,527 5,988 - 269,902 16.9%
1980 102,346 167,576 283,315 8,483 - 561,720 18.2%
1985 166,296 202,739 572,742 19,188 - 960,965 17.3%
1990 267,407 14,093 765,482 25,510 443,074 1,515,566 17.6%
1995 346,892 19,648 958,668 30,411 704,615 2,060,234 16.8%
2000 398,633 24,282 817,085 39,233 924,561 2,203,794 18.1%
2003 366,198 26,811 556,483 46,015 1,112,065 2,107,572 17.4%
‘00/’70 35.9 2.2 16.4 6.9 - 28.5 1.3
(Note):
(1)This table was made by the authors based on the Japan Highway Public Corporation’s Annual Profit
and Loss Statement.
(2)  Unit: million yen
(3)  Road Service Costs consist of general administration costs and maintenance costs of highways.
(4)  Non-road Service Costs are interest payments on bonds and loans, etc.
(5)  Repayment Fund is pooled money for the repayment of debts.11
4.3 Debts and the Expenditure on Highway Construction
As we explain later, one critical problem of the Japan Highway Public Corporation is that
it holds a huge amount of debt.    This  debt became  the trigger  for the privatization  of the Japan
Highway Public Corporation.    There are four main financial sources for highway construction: toll
revenues,  highway  bonds,  loans  from  banks,  and  government  subsidies  and  social  capital  fund.
Because the construction costs for highways are huge, it is impossible to pay the construction costs
by user charges.    In general, Miyagawa (2004) summarizes the highway business as follows.    The
two main costs which the JH incurs, “the construction costs of highways + the management costs of
the  JH”  are  financed  by  three  sources:    “highway  bonds  +  loans  from  banks  +  government
investment.”    Also, the “principal + interest” for the debts is repaid by “toll revenues + government
subsidies.”    If  the  JH  constructs  more  highways  than  its  repaying  ability  can  cover,  using  toll
revenues and government subsidies, then its debts become larger because the JH has to depend on
highway bonds and loans.    As a result, accumulated debts become larger.    In fact, at the end of
2003, the accumulated debts of the JH reached 2,070 billion yen, debts presumably caused by the
reason  mentioned  above.    Figure  2  shows  the  relationship  of  accumulated  debts,  construction
expenditures,  and  service  revenues  (toll  revenues  etc)  after  subtracting  road  service  costs.
Certainly, construction expenditures  are far above the service revenues before 1990.    As a result,
the accumulated debts are increasing.    However, from the mid-1990s, the construction expenditures















Figure 2    Debts, Construction Expenditure and Service Revenues12
4.4 Cost Analysis of Highway Providing Service
In this section, we will estimate the cost function of highway maintenance service.    There
are mainly three purposes.    First, we would like to know the cost profile of maintenance activity.
We  can  find  the  structure  of  maintenance  costs.    Second,  we  can  obtain  the  marginal  cost  of
maintenance activity by using the estimated cost function.    Third, in order to evaluate the minimum
average cost, we will estimate the maintenance cost function of highway service.    This is related to
the horizontal separation issue discussed in the next section.  
The cost function of maintenance service in this study is formulated as follows.
lnC = a0 + dN lnN + Si bi lnwi + gV lnV + 1/2dNN (lnN)
2 +
  Si dNi (lnN)(lnwi) +dNV(lnN)(lnV)+1/2SjSibij(lnwi)(lnwj)+
SibiV (lnwi)(lnV) + 1/2 gVV (lnV)
2, (4.1)
Where C, maintenance activity costs; N, highway length; wi, input factor price (i (or j) = L (labor)
and M(material); V (number of vehicle).
In this model, we also impose the restriction on input factor prices such that Si bi =1, Si dNi
=0, Sibij =0, SibiV =0, bij =bji.    Furthermore, we apply Shephard’s Lemma from equation (4.1) and
obtain the input share equation.
Si = bi + Si dNi (lnN) + Sjbij(lnwj)+ biV (lnV) (4.2)
where Si, input i’s share of maintenance activity costs.
As for the estimation  method, we apply SUR (Seemingly  Unrelated Regression)  for the
cost function and input share equation.    For estimation, we divide all observations of each variable
by the sample mean.
The  data  for  the  analysis  is  obtained  from  documents  of  the  Japan  Highway  Public
Corporation.    Observations  are 48 in number,  comprised of a time-series data set of the JH from
1956 to 2003.    The  maintenance  costs  consist  of administration  costs and management  costs,  in
which depreciation and the construction costs of highways are not included.    Wage is defined by
dividing general administration  costs  by number of employees.    The material  price is defined by
dividing the management costs by number of routes.    Statistics of used variables are shown in Table
6 and the estimation result is shown in Table 7.    In general, the estimation results as a first step are
acceptable  because the key variables  such as network length (N) and input factor prices (wL, wM)
show a reasonable  sign and R
2 is rather high.    Based  on this analysis, the marginal  costs of the
maintenance activity is 140 million yen per km.    If we divided this marginal cost by average traffic
volume per day, which is 38 thousand cars per day in 1999, then the share of the marginal cost of
maintenance becomes about 10 yen.    Compared with toll price per km, which is 24.6 yen, the toll
price is twice higher than the marginal costs.13
Table 6 Statistics of Used Variables





Million yen 184,384 162,505 2,841 478,961
wL Wage Thousand yen 6,857 3,774 2,341 16,193
wM Material
price
Million yen 1,419 1,213 10 3,221
N Network km 3,609 2,610 95 8,264
V Number of
vehicles
Million car 993 803 5 2,248
SL Share of
labor cost
- 0.4750 0.2472 0.2171 0.9390
SM Share of
material cost
- 0.5250 0.2472 0.0610 0.7829
Table 7    Estimation Results of Maintenance Cost Function:
Coefficients and Standard Error































Number of observations 48
  (lnN)(lnwM) 0.2216***
(0.0315)
Log of likelihood 58.7473




5.  Privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation
5.1 Reasons for Privatization
Four  expressway  public  corporations—the  Japan  Highway  Public  Corporation,  the
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation, the Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation and the
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority--were privatized on October 1, 2005.  14
Roads  for  highway  privatization  were  designated  on  December  19,  2001,  when  the
“Reorganization  and  Reform  Plan  of  Special  Public  Corporations”  was  approved  at  the  Cabinet
meeting of Prime Minister  Koizumi  on December 19, 2001 (Ministry  of Land, Infrastructure  and
Transport, 2005).    The basic policy of the plan was that whatever public services the private sector
could  provide  without  trouble  should  be  contracted  out  to  the private  sector.    Under  the  Prime
Minister’s  principle,  the “Committee  for Promoting Privatization  of  Four Highway-related  Public
Corporations”  discussed  the reform  plan  of these  corporations.    The  committee  addressed  many
issues, for example the huge amount of debt, the unstoppable nature  of highway construction, the
expensive toll level, the regional imbalance of highways (inadequate in large cities and redundant in
rural  areas),  the  inefficient  management  of  the  Public  Corporation,  the  extra  costs  due  to    the
Corporation’s family companies, and political intervention in highway construction.
On December 6, 2002, the committee’s final opinion report, in which it recommended as
an organizational form so called vertical separation (highway service companies providing service to
an  infrastructure  holding  organization),  was  proposed  to  the  Prime  Minister  (Ministry  of  Land,
Infrastructure  and  Transport,  2005).    Based  on  the  committee’s  opinion,  the  basic  plan  of  the
privatization  of  four  highway-related  public  corporations  was  made  in  the  joint-meeting  of
government and ruling parties on December 22, 2003, and the laws regarding the privatization of
highway  public  corporations  were  approved  in  Diet  on  June  2,  2004  (Ministry  of  Land,
Infrastructure and Transport, 2005).  
According  to the Ministry  of Land,  Infrastructure  and Transport  (2005),  there are  three
main purposes for the privatization of the four highway public corporations:
-  Secure repayment of interest-bearing debts, amounting to 40 trillion yen
-  Construction, without delay, of genuinely needed expressways with a minimum burden on the
general public, while paying due respect to autonomy of the companies
-    Offering of diverse and flexible prices and services by utilizing the private sector’s know-how.
5.2 Organization Established by Privatization
In  the  privatization  of  four  highway  public  corporations,  the  experiences  of  the
privatization  of  Japan  National  Railway  in  1987  were  taken  into  account.    The  most  important
characteristics  of  the  organizational  reforms  of  these  four  expressway  public  corporations  are
regional  subdivision  and  vertical  separation.    Figure  3  shows  a  comparison  of  organizational
structure  between  before-privatization  and  after-privatization.    There  are  two  characteristics  of
organizational structure: Horizontal Separation and Vertical Separation.
First,  the  Japan  Highway  Public  Corporation  was  privatized  in  October,  2005,  and
regionally  separated  into  three  expressway  companies:  East  Nippon  Expressway  Company  Ltd.,
Central Nippon  Expressway  Company  Ltd.  and West  Nippon  Expressway  Company  Ltd.    Three15
other  public  corporations  were  also  privatized  without  subdivision:  Metropolitan  Expressway
Company  Ltd.  (former  Metropolitan  Expressway  Public  Corporation),  Hanshin  Expressway
Company  Ltd.  (former  Hanshin  Expressway  Public  Corporation),  and  Honshu-Shikoku  Bridge
Express Company Ltd. (Honshu-Shikoku Bridge authority).    Metropolitan Expressway Company is
providing services in the Tokyo metropolitan area and Hanshin Expressway Company is doing so in
the Osaka metropolitan area.    Honshu-Shikoku  Bridge Express Company is planned to be merged
to West Nippon Expressway  Company after the management of the Honshu-Shikoku  Company  is
stabilized.    The  main  role  of  these  six  regionally  separated  expressway  companies  is  providing
express services by performing administration and maintenance of highway roads and service areas
only by renting from the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency.    Table 8 shows a
summary of the profile of these service providing companies.    These six companies are joint-stock
companies but all shares are still held by the government.  












































































Expressway 52.5 2,800 3,350 265 2,300
Central Nippon
Expressway
65.0 2,400 1,687 162 1,600
West Nippon
Expressway 47.5 2,800 3,249 253 2,300
Metopolitan
Expressway 13.5 1,250 283 6 1,120
Hanshin
Expressway 10.0 830 234 15 910
Honshu-
Shikoku Bridge
4.0 406 173 11 40
(Note): This table was made by the authors based on each company’s corporate profiles and their
business plan for FY’05 and FY’06.
The second characteristic  of highway reform is vertical separation between the highway
service provider and the infrastructure holding organization.    In order to achieve privatization of the
four  highway-related  public  corporations,  a  new  organization  was  founded  as  an  incorporated
administrative  organization in order to reduce the financial  burden  for highway  companies and to
support  the  successful  operation  of  highway  services  for  highway  companies.    The  new
organization, the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment (JEHDR) Agency, holds highway
facilities and leases to expressway companies.    This  JEHDR Agency is a public organization and
takes over the highway assets of four highway-related public corporations and debts.    The JEHDR
Agency plans to repay the debts of the former public corporations by collecting highway fees from
six  companies.    After  finishing  the  repayment  in  45  years,  the  JEHDR  Agency  is  slated  to  be
dissolved.    The relationship of the JEHDR Agency and the highway service providing companies is
summarized in Figure 4.17
Figure 4    Relationship of JEHDR Agency and Service Providing Companies
6.  Evaluations of Privatization of Japan Highway Public Corporation
6.1  Size of Horizontal Separation
As  for  horizontal  separation,  six  highway  service  providing  companies  are  created  by
subdividing the Japan Highway Public Corporation.    Separation options were not made public, and
the rationale is not clear for these six highway  companies.    One problem  is regional variation  in
size and the other problem is the number of subdivisions.    Indeed, in the case of the privatization of
JNR, the size variation was big among JR companies.    In the privatization of British railways, the
service  areas  are  divided  into  25  regions  (Preston,  1996).    In  this  study,  we  evaluate  the
organizational size of a highway company.    The methodology used here follows Mizutani (2004),
which finds the size with the minimum average cost by using the estimated cost function.
The outline of the method is as follows.    First, the average cost function is defined  by
using the highway  maintenance  costs,  that  is AC = C/Q, because  the newly  established  highway
company’s main activity is considered the management of highway facilities by providing service to
users.    Second, by differentiating the average cost function by network length (N), we can obtain
the result from the first order condition for the minimum average cost, that is ∂AC/∂N = 0.    Third,
the main goal in this section is to find the size of network  in which a highway company has the
minimum average costs.    Therefore, in this study, other factors except network related to costs are
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The  shape  of  the  average  cost  function  is  U-shaped,  with  the  average  cost  declining
sharply as the network  size increases and it starts to go up from some point of the network size.
When we calculate the point which attains the minimum average costs, we get the result in which the
size of the highway network is about 1030km.
If we evaluate  the size of the newly privatized  highway  companies, it seems  that some
highway  companies  are  too  large.    For  example,  East  Nippon  Expressway’s  network  length  is
3,350km, which covers the eastern part of Japan.    Similarly, West Nippon  Expressway’s network
length is also large at 3,249km, which covers the western part of Japan.ɹ Based on calculation results,
these organizations should be divided into two or three organizations.
6.2  Vertical Separation and Investment
Generally  speaking,  vertical  separation  has  become  a  common  policy  in  many  public
utility industries.    Especially,  in the rail industry in Europe, vertical separation is common.    Nash
(1997) discussed advantages  and disadvantages in rail industries  from a theoretical  point of view.
Although  vertical  separation  in  the rail  industry  is not quite the same  as that in highways,  some
points  are  similar.    Vertical  separation  in  highways  makes  it easier  to  (1)  promote  a variety  of
service providing  companies  if  we can divide  them  into the governmental  franchise  markets,  (2)
clarify  intra-industry  relationships  and  (3)  specialize  activities.    On  the  other  hand,  vertical
separation  makes  it  difficult  to  (1)  set  up  fair  prices  and  monitor  performance,  (2)  negotiate
arrangements between two organizations.
One big advantage  is that the debts of the JH are separated  from the newly established
highway service providing companies so that the new companies can be free from financial burden.
This course of action most likely results from lessons in the privatization of JNR.
However,  the  newly  established  highway  providing  companies  also  have  the  role  of
constructing highways.    We think that if a truly vertical separation policy is taken, the construction
of highways should be done by the infrastructure holding organization.    Under  current conditions,
benefits from specializing activities cannot be expected.    Presumably, in order to control unlimited
investment in highway construction,  the new highway service provider should assume the role of
highway construction.
Many things such as decisions regarding toll level, infrastructure charges, construction of
highways, profit and so on are decided through negotiations between highway providing companies
and the infrastructure organization, making transaction costs very large.    Furthermore,  agreements
of both  organizations  are  approved  by  the  Ministry  of Land,  Infrastructure  and  Transport.    One
concern  regards  the  decision  to  construct  new  highways.    Seemingly,  construction  itself  is  the
highway providing company’s role so that the companies do not need to construct highways if they
do not have enough money.    However, as long as there is negotiation between the two organizations,19
political intervention through the infrastructure holding company might be inevitable.
6.3 Other
Several  problems  remain.    First,  the  privatization  of  the  highway-related  public
corporations  is  not  complete.    One  important  concern  is  that  partial  privatization  might  invite
unreasonable political intervention.    In fact, in the case of the privatization of the JNR, after several
years passed,  the government  asked  the JR companies  for  extra payment  toward  left-over  debts,
producing resentment among the JR companies (Mizutani, 1999).    On the other had, an advantage
of not fully  privatizing  at once is that stock can be sold after the partially  privatized  companies’
performance  increases.    In  general,  it  takes  a  few  years  to  improve  corporate  performance.
Therefore, full privatization taken after improved performance would contribute to the repayment of
left-over debts.
Second, while the organizational  reforms are accomplished, incentive  regulations are not
well  designed.    Each  independent  expressway  company  is  actually  a  regional  monopoly.    The
regulation  method  appears  to  be  traditional  regulation  by  the  government,  leaving  expressway
companies with few incentives to improve their performance.    As Fujii (2005) also pointed out, one
realistic method  to employ  the incentive  regulation  would  be a  yardstick  regulation.    In  fact,  in
Japanese  public  utility  industries  such  as  railways  and  electric  power  industries,  the  yardstick
regulation  is  already  being  applied,  and  this  method  should  be  used  with  regard  to  highway
privatization as soon as possible.
Last, it is unclear how expensive highway tolls can be reduced.    The privatization plan by
the government merely mentioned the private company’s management and use of new technology
such as ETC.ɹɹAlthough the increase of ETC can reduce labor, the decrease in cost might not be
enough.    As long as there remain in effect the full repayment principle and the pooling system of
toll revenues, the toll level will not be reduced dramatically.    Two possible ideas for reform would
be the use of gasoline taxes for the construction of highways and/or a policy change from making
roads toll-free after 45 years to making them toll-roads forever, but with a reduction in the price of
the tolls.
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